Janice L. Debry v. Delbert T. Goates, M.D. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Janice L. Debry v. Delbert T. Goates, M.D. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bel-Ami de Montreux; Montreux Freres; attorneys for appellant.
P. Keith Nelson, Mark L. McCarty; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; attorneys for appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation







OOCKE&MQ? L. DEBRTT 
IN tm UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PLAINT IFF /APPELLANT , 
vs. 
DELBERT T. GOATES, M.D. 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE . 
CASE NO. 981420 
PRIORITY NO. 15 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from the trial court's order granting the 
defendant/appellee's motion for summary judgment, entered in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding. 
Bel-Ami de Montreux (#6207) 
Attorney at Law 
MONTREUX FRERES, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 208 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
P. Keith Nelson 
Mark L. McCarthy 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
FILED 
MAY 5 - 1999 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANICE L. DEBRY, 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT , 
vs. 
DELBERT T. GOATES, M.D. 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE . 
CASE NO. 981420 
PRIOTY NO. 15 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from the trial court's order granting the 
defendant/appellee's motion for summary judgment, entered in the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding. 
Bel-Ami de Montreux (#6207) 
Attorney at Law 
MONTREUX FRERES, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 208 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
P. Keith Nelson 
Mark L. McCarthy 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW, PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, NATURE OF THE CASE, 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 9 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 14 
ARGUMENT 15 
I. THERE WAS A DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
GOATES AND DEBRY 15 
II. MS. DEBRY DID NOT WAIVE THE DOCTOR-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 21 
CONCLUSION 26 
ADDENDUM 28 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED ii 
Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814 (Utah 1958) 20, 21, 25, 26 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) 20, 21, 26 
Clawson v. Walgreen Drug, 162 P.2d 759 (Utah 1945) 24 
Middleton v. Beckett, 960 P.2d 1213 (Colo.App. 1998) 16, 20 
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991) 1, 2 
State v. Pitchford, 697 P.2d 896 (Kan. App. 1985)...16, 17, 19, 20 
Styers v. Superior Court In and For 
County of Mohave, 779 P.2d 352 (Ariz.App. 1989) 23, 24, 25 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §58-60-102 2 
Utah Code Ann. §58-60-113 3, 15 
Utah Code Ann. §58-60-114 3, 23 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (j) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8 4, 15, 23 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35 5, 11, 22, 23 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 6 
Utah Rule of Evidence 506 7, 15, 20, 23, 25 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANICE L. DEBRY , : 
PLAINTIFF /APPELLANT , J 
V S . J 
DELBERT T. GOATES, M.D. J 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE . 
CASE NO. 981420 
: PRIOTY NO. 15 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) provides this Court's 
jurisdiction over this appeal transferred to this Court by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW, 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on 
the basis that Debry failed to establish a doctor-patient 
relationship? 
The granting of summary judgment presents questions of law, 
to be reviewed without deference for correctness. See e.g. 
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am. , Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 
1991). 
This issue was addressed in Ms. Debry's memorandum opposing 
summary judgment (e.g. R. 237-238). 
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on 
the basis that Ms. Debry waived the doctor-patient privilege? 
The granting of summary judgment presents questions of law, 
to be reviewed without deference for correctness. See e.g. 
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 
1991). 
This issue was addressed in Ms. Debry's memorandum opposing 
summary judgment (e.g. R. 239-242). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules pertain: 
Utah Code Ann. §58-60-102 
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, 
as used in this chapter: 
(1) "Client" or "patient" means an individual who 
consults or is examined or interviewed by a mental health 
therapist acting in his professional capacity. 
(2) "Confidential communication" means information, 
including information obtained by the mental health 
therapist's examination of the client or patient, which is: 
(a) (i) transmitted between the client or patient 
and a mental health therapist in the course of that 
relationship; or 
(ii) transmitted among the client or patient, the 
mental health therapist, and individuals who are 
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the 
direction of the mental health therapist, including members 
of the client's or patient's family; and 
(b) made in confidence, for the diagnosis or 
treatment of the client or patient by the mental health 
therapist, and by a means not intended to be disclosed to 
third persons other than those individuals: 
(i) present to further the interest of the client or 
patient in the consultation, examination, or interview; 
(ii) reasonably necessary for the transmission of 
the communications; or 
(iii) participating in the diagnosis and treatment of 
the client or patient under the direction of the mental 
health therapist. 
(3) "Hypnosis" means, regarding individuals exempted 
from licensure under this chapter, a process by which one 
individual induces or assists another individual into a 
hypnotic state without the use of drugs or other substances 
and for the purpose of increasing motivation or to assist 
the individual to alter lifestyles or habits. 
(4) "Individual" means a natural person. 
(5) "Mental health therapist" means an individual 
licensed under this title as a: 
(a) physician and surgeon, or osteopathic physician 
engaged in the practice of mental health therapy; 
(b) registered psychiatric mental health nurse 
specialist; 
(c) psychologist qualified to engage in the practice 
of mental health therapy; 
(d) clinical social worker; 
(e) certified social worker; 
(f) marriage and family therapist; or 
(g) professional counselor. 
(6) "Mental illness" means a mental or emotional 
condition defined in an approved diagnostic and statistical 
manual for mental disorders generally recognized in the 
professions of mental health therapy listed under 
Subsection (5). 
(7) "Practice of mental health therapy" means treatment 
or prevention of mental illness, including: 
(a) conducting a professional evaluation of an 
individual's condition of mental health, mental illness, or 
emotional disorder consistent with standards generally 
recognized in the professions of mental health therapy 
listed under Subsection (5); 
(b) establishing a diagnosis in accordance with 
established written standards generally recognized in the 
professions of mental health therapy listed under 
Subsection (5); 
(c) prescribing a plan for the prevention or 
treatment of a condition of mental illness or emotional 
disorder; and 
(d) engaging in the conduct of professional 
intervention, including psychotherapy by the application of 
established methods and procedures generally recognized in 
the professions of mental health therapy listed under 
Subsection (5). 
(8) "Unlawful conduct" is as defined in Sections 
58-1-501 and 58-60-109. 
(9) "Unprofessional conduct" is as defined in Sections 
58-1-501 and 58-60-110, and may be further defined by 
division rule. 
Utah Code Ann. §58-60-113 
Evidentiary privilege for mental health therapists 
regarding admissibility of any confidential communication 
in administrative, civil, or criminal proceedings is in 
accordance with Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. §58-60-114 
(1) A mental health therapist under this chapter 
may not disclose any confidential communication with a 
client or patient without the express consent of: 
(a) the client or patient; 
(b) the parent or legal guardian of a minor client or 
patient; or 
(c) the authorized agent of a client or patient. 
o 
(2) A mental health therapist under this chapter 
is not subject to Subsection (1) if: 
(a) he is permitted or required by state or federal 
law, rule, regulation, or order to report or disclose any 
confidential communication, including: 
(i) reporting under Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Part 4, 
Child Abuse or Neglect Reporting Requirements; 
(ii) reporting under Title 62A, Chapter 3, Part 3, 
Abuse, Neglect, or Exploitation of Disabled Adult; 
(iii) reporting under Title 78, Chapter 14a, 
Limitation of Therapist's Duty to Warn; 
(iv) reporting of a communicable disease as required 
under Section 26-6-6; 
(b) the disclosure is part of an administrative, 
civil, or criminal proceeding and is made under an 
exemption from evidentiary privilege under Rule 506, Utah 
Rules of Evidence; or 
(c) the disclosure is made under a generally recognized 
professional or ethical standard that authorizes or 
requires the disclosure. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8 
There are particular relations in which it is the 
policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve 
it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a 
witness in the following cases: 
(1) (a) Neither a wife nor a husband may either 
during the marriage or afterwards be, without the consent 
of the other, examined as to any communication made by one 
to the other during the marriage. 
(b) This exception does not apply: 
(i) to a civil action or proceeding by one 
spouse against the other; 
(ii) to a criminal action or proceeding for 
a crime committed by one spouse against the 
other; 
(iii) to the crime of deserting or 
neglecting to support a spouse or 
child; 
(iv) to any civil or criminal proceeding for 
abuse or neglect committed against the child of 
either spouse; or 
(v) if otherwise specifically provided by 
law. 
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his 
client, be examined as to any communication made by the 
client to him or his advice given regarding the 
communication in the course of his professional employment. 
An attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk cannot be 
examined, without the consent of his employer, concerning 
any fact, the knowledge of which has been acquired in his 
capacity as an employee. 
(3) A clergyman or priest cannot, without the consent 
of the person making the confession, be examined as to any 
confession made to him in his professional character in the 
course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he 
belongs. 
(4) A physician or surgeon cannot, without the 
consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to 
any information acquired in attending the patient which was 
necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the 
patient. However, this privilege shall be deemed to be 
waived by the patient in an action in which the patient 
places his medical condition at issue as an element or 
factor of his claim or defense. Under those circumstances, 
a physician or surgeon who has prescribed for or treated 
that patient for the medical condition at issue may provide 
information, interviews, reports, records, statements, 
memoranda, or other data relating to the patient's medical 
condition and treatment which are placed at issue. 
(5) A public officer cannot be examined as to 
communications made to him in official confidence when the 
public interests would suffer by the disclosure. 
(6) A sexual assault counselor as defined in Section 
78-3c-3 cannot, without the consent of the victim, be 
examined in a civil or criminal proceeding as to any 
confidential communication as defined in Section 78-3c-3 
made by the victim. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35 
(a) Order for examination. When the mental or 
physical condition (including the blood group) of a party 
or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of 
a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is 
pending may order the party or person to submit to a 
physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or 
certified examiner or to produce for examination the person 
in the party's custody or legal control. The order may be 
made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to 
the person to be examined and to all parties and shall 
specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of 
the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to 
be made. 
(b) Report of examining physician. 
(1) If requested by a party against whom an order 
is made under Rule 35(a) or the person examined, the 
party causing the examination to be made shall 
deliver to the person examined and/or the other party 
a copy of a detailed written report of the examiner 
setting out the examiner's findings, including 
results of all tests made, diagnosis and conclusions, 
together with like reports of all earlier 
examinations of the same condition. After delivery 
the party causing the examination shall be entitled 
upon request to receive from the party against whom 
the order is made a like report of any examination, 
previously or thereafter made, of the same condition, 
unless, in the case of a report of examination of a 
person not a party, the party shows that the report 
cannot be obtained. The court on motion may order 
delivery of a report on such terms as are just, and 
if an examiner fails or refuses to make a report the 
court may exclude the examiner's testimony if offered 
at the trial. 
R 
(2) By requesting and obtaining a report of the 
examination so ordered or by taking the deposition of 
the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege 
the party may have in that action or any other 
involving the same controversy, regarding the 
testimony of every other person who has examined or 
may thereafter examine the party in respect of the 
same mental or physical condition. 
(3) This subdivision applies to examinations made 
by agreement of the parties, unless the agreement 
expressly provides otherwise. This subdivision does 
not preclude discovery of a report of any other 
examiner or the taking of a deposition of an examiner 
in accordance with the provisions of any other rule. 
(c) Right of party examined to other medical reports. At 
the time of making an order to submit to an examination 
under Subdivision (a) of this rule, the court shall, upon 
motion of the party to be examined, order the party seeking 
such examination to furnish to the party to be examined a 
report of any examination previously made or medical 
treatment previously given by any examiner employed 
directly or indirectly by the party seeking the order for a 
physical or mental examination, or at whose instance or 
request such medical examination or treatment has 
previously been conducted. If the party seeking the 
examination refuses to deliver such report, the court on 
motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on 
such terms as are just; and if an examiner fails or refuses 
to make such a report the court may exclude the examiner's 
testimony if offered at the trial, or may make such other 
order as is authorized under Rule 37. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a 
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration 
of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after 
service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, 
memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in 
accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the 
whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what 
material facts exist without substantial controversy and 
what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying 
the facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the 
trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or 
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear 
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken 
or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to 
the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the 
affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in 
bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court 
shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to 
the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which 
the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 506 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined 
or interviewed by a physician or mental health therapist. 
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably 
believed by the patient to be licensed, to practice 
medicine in any state. 
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or 
is reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed or 
certified in any state as a physicianf psychologist, 
clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family 
therapist, advanced practice registered nurse designated as 
a registered psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, or 
professional counselor while that person is engaged in the 
diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, 
including alcohol or drug addition. 
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is 
communicated in confidence and for the purpose of 
diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a 
privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent any other person from disclosing (1) 
diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a 
physician or mental health therapist, (2) information 
obtained by examination of the patient, and (3) information 
transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health 
therapist, and persons who are participating in the 
diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician 
or mental health therapist, including guardians or members 
of the patient's family who are present to further the 
interest of the patient because they are reasonably 
necessary for the transmission of the communications, or 
participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the 
direction of the physician or mental health therapist. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be 
claimed by the patient, or the guardian or conservator of 
the patient. The person who was the physician or mental 
health therapist at the time of the communication is 
presumed to have authority during the life of the patient 
to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a 
communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, 
or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in 
which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, 
or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in which 
any party relies upon the condition as an element of the 
claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For 
communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to 
hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the mental 
health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment 
has determined that the patient is in need of 
hospitalization; 
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made 
in the course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a 
court-ordered examination of the physical, mental, or 
emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or 
witness, unless the court in ordering the examination 
specifies otherwise. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Ms. Debry filed suit against Delbert E. Goates, M.D., in a 
complaint alleging medical malpractice as a result of an affidavit 
Goates wrote, which was filed by Ms. Debry's former husband in Ms. 
Debry's divorce case, Janice L. Debry v. Robert J. Debry, Civil 
No. 94401038DA (R. 69-80) (R. 1-3).x 
After Goates filed his answer to the complaint (R. 7-9), 
Debry obtained leave of the trial court and filed an amended 
complaint alleging medical malpractice, slander per se, and 
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, stemming from 
the issuance of the affidavit (R. 21-27f 49). Goates then filed 
an answer to the amended complaint (R. 50-52). 
Goates moved for summary judgment (R. 107-223, 226-227), 
Debry opposed the motion (R. 230-307), and Goates filed a reply 
memorandum in support (R. 331-366). 
Judge Wilkinson heard the motion and granted it in an order 
dated and filed on June 22, 1998 (R. 544-547). 
Debry filed a timely notice of appeal on July 20, 1998 (R. 
550). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the course of a divorce between Ms. Debry and her 
former husband, Robert Debry, which was being heard by Judge Homer 
1
 The record of the divorce case, which is also on appeal, in case number 
960571-CA, has been supplemented to the record in this case. Unless expressly 
noted that reference is being made to the divorce case, citations to the 
record are to the district court pleadings files in this case. 
F. Wilkinson, the defendant in this case, Delbert T. Goates, M.D., 
signed an affidavit on behalf of Mr. Debry, indicating that Ms. 
Debry was mentally ill, and recommending that excessive alimony 
might exacerbate her conditions. The affidavit stated, 
My name is Delbert T. Goates. I give the following 
testimony under oath. 
1. I am an adult and child psychiatrist. 
2. I have had numerous consultations with Jan DeBry 
from June 17, 1990 to the present. 
3. In addition, I have had consultations with her 
current husband, her first husband and all of her children. 
4. In my opinion, Mrs. DeBry experiences the traits of 
a narcissistic personality. Features of this condition 
include pathological exaggeration, interpersonal 
exploitation, and feelings or fantasies of grandiosity. 
However, persons with this disorder also demonstrate a 
charming and even charismatic exterior. 
5. In my opinion, this has been a lifelong condition 
which was acquired prior to her late adolescence. 
6. I am aware that Mrs. DeBry has been in intensive 
psychotherapy regarding her depression (a common 
concomitant condition) for several years with several 
therapists. Further evaluation addressing her personality 
traits is certainly warranted as an impediment to her 
optimal function and the treatment of her depression.[sic] 
7. Reasonable alimony will sustain Mrs. DeBry's needs. 
There can be a psychological or therapeutic component to 
alimony. Excessive alimony might feed Mrs. DeBry's 
grandiose fantasies and exploitive tendencies for enhanced 
self-worth and delusions of grandeur. 
8. Mrs. DeBry's current therapists might be able to 
use these Court proceedings for therapeutic purposes. 
Therefore, it is recommended that the Court work with Mrs. 
DeBryrs current therapists on the issue of whether, and 
when, and how Mrs. DeBry should be confronted with my 
affidavit, herein. 
(R. 76-78).2 (Addendum I, Goatesf Affidavit). 
Mr. Debry filed the Goates affidavit on May 26, 1994, in 
conjunction with his motion for a mental examination of Janice 
Debry, which was filed on May 27f 1994 (R. 122-127 in this case, 
R. 26-28, 48-55 in the divorce file). The memorandum supporting 
the motion for a mental examination of Janice Debry provided, 
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: 
(a) Order for examination. When the mental . . . condition 
. . . of a party . . . is in controversy, the court in 
which the action is pending may order the party or person 
to submit to a . . . mental examination by a suitably 
licensed or certified examiner. . . . The order may be made 
only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the 
person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify 
the time, place manner, conditions, and scope of the 
examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be 
made. 
In this case, the mental condition of Janice Debry is 
at issue for three reasons: 
First, plaintiff Janice DeBry is spending $3000-$5000 
per month for psychotherapy. Plaintiff will undoubtedly 
seek a support award which includes substantial sums for 
psychotherapy. Therefore, defendant should be entitled to 
a mental examination to determine whether the metal [sic] 
illness predated the marriage, and how much continuing 
therapy is necessary and appropriate. 
Second, this Court will be called upon to determine an 
appropriate amount of temporary support and alimony. 
2
 Mr. Debry attempted to persuade at least one other doctor to diagnose 
Ms. Debry with narcissistic personality disorder, and filed a complaint 
against the doctor with the Utah Division of Occupational Licensing when the 
doctor refused to do so. The Division later dismissed the complaint, finding 
it to be without merit (296-299). 
However, the Affidavit of Dr. Delbert Goates, filed 
herewith, shows that plaintiff suffers from grandiose 
delusions. Therefore, plaintiff's demands for support may 
be artificially inflated because of plaintiff's alleged 
mental illness. 
Third, defendant seeks the appointment of a 
conservator for plaintiff. Defendant should be entitled to 
a mental examination to lay the predicate for the 
conservatorship hearing, [at this juncture footnote 2 
appears, the text of which is as follows: There are 
several reasons to appoint a conservator; not the least of 
which, is that Mrs. DeBry's mental illness will make it 
impossible for her to enter into any reasonable settlement 
negotiations. If the case is to be settled, it would have 
to be through a conservator.] 
(R. 122-123).3 
On December 20, 1994, Judge Wilkinson denied the motion for 
an independent medical examination in the divorce case, with the 
proviso that if Ms. Debry claimed expenses for counseling and 
therapy, Mr. Debry was entitled to an independent psychiatric 
examination (R. 256-257). 
3
 Mr. Debry simultaneously filed an affidavit indicating, 
My name is Robert J. Debry. I give the following testimony under oath: 
1. I have been advised by competent mental health professionals that my 
wife suffers from a sever [sic] narcissistic personality disorder (also known 
as a mental illness). 
2. I have made extensive inquiry to determine the best facility in the 
United States to diagnose and treat this disorder. The Menninger Clinic in 
Topeka, Kansas was on top of everyone's list. 
3. I asked my wife if she would voluntarily go in for a one week 
evaluation. She agreed to go if I would give her extra money to pay some 
outstanding bills she had incurred. 
4. Based upon her promise, I gave her approximately $18,000 in extra 
support payments. 
5. Mrs. DeBry spent the money, and then canceled two days prior to the 
scheduled evaluation. 
6. In the meantime, Mrs. DeBry is spending $3,000-$5,000 per month for 
psychotherapy. I question the value and effectiveness of that therapy. 
(R. 305-06). 
Ms. Debry later filed this suitf alleging that in issuing the 
affidavit without Ms. Debry's prior approval and without invoking 
Ms. Debry's doctor/patient privilege, Goates violated Ms. Debry's 
doctor/patient privilege and committed medical malpractice (R. 1-
4). In her amended complaintf Ms. Debry added an allegation that 
the issuance of the affidavit constituted slander per se, arguing 
that the contents of the Goates affidavit were false and intended 
to injure Ms. Debry and her reputation (R. 24-25). She also added 
an allegation that the issuance of the affidavit constituted 
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress (R. 25-26). 
In his motion for summary judgment, Goates argued that there 
was no doctor-patient relationship between him and Ms. Debry, and 
thus he owed and breached no duty to her in issuing the affidavit 
(R. 110-111), and that if there was a doctor-patient relationship, 
Ms. Debry waived the privilege when Ms. Debry placed her medical 
condition at issue in the Debry divorce (R. 112-113). Goates also 
argued that his affidavit did not constitute slander per se (R. 
114-115), that he was absolutely privileged by the judicial 
privilege (R. 115-117), that his conduct was insufficiently 
outrageous to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of severe 
emotional distress (R. 117-119), and that Debry had not 
established proximate cause between her injuries and the Goates 
affidavit (R. 119-120). 
In reply, Ms. Debry argued that the evidence established that 
there was a doctor-patient relationship (R. 237-238), and that Ms. 
Debry did not waive the privilege (R. 238-242). Ms. Debry also 
argued that the affidavit did constitute slander per se (R. 243-
244), that Goates was not entitled to claim the judicial privilege 
(R. 242-243), that Goates' conduct was sufficiently outrageous to 
sustain a claim of intentional infliction of intentional 
infliction of severe emotional distress (R. 244-245), and that 
Debry had established that the issuance of the Goates affidavit 
was the proximate cause of her injuries (R. 245-246). 
In the minute entry granting summary judgment, Judge 
Wilkinson stated, "The court finds the privilege belongs to the 
plaintiff. The court finds there was not a doctor-patient 
relationship. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is 
granted." (R. 544). [Addendum II, Court's Minute Entry]. The 
order prepared by counsel for Goates and signed by Judge Wilkinson 
states, "Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and 
plaintiff's Complaint and each and every cause of action thereof 
shall be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits 
on the basis that plaintiff has not established that a 
physician/patient relationship existed between her and Dr. Goates, 
and that even if a physician/patient relationship did exist, that 
relationship was waived at the time Dr. Goates submitted his 
affidavit in the divorce case." (R. 545-546) [Addendum III, 
Court's Order]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment was entered on two basis: there was no 
doctor-patient relationship between Goates and Debry, and Debry 
waived the doctor-patient privilege prior to Goates' issuance of 
the affidavit. 
Review of the governing law demonstrates that there was 
indeed a doctor-patient relationship between Goates and Debry, and 
that Debry did not waive her doctor-patient privilege prior to 
Goates' issuance of the affidavit. 
To the extent that the facts underlying these two issues were 
in dispute, the trial court should have resolved them in Ms. 
Debry's favor in ruling on the summary judgment motion. 
Because the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment and remand this case for a trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I . THERE WAS A DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN GOATES AND DEBRY. 
For purposes of confident ia l communications between a doctor 
and p a t i e n t , Utah Rule of Evidence 506(a)(1)4 defines a pa t i en t as 
"a person who consu l t s or i s examined or in terviewed by a 
phys i c i an or mental hea l t h t h e r a p i s t . " 506(a) (2) de f ines 
physician as "a person l icensed , or reasonably bel ieved by the 
p a t i e n t t o be l icensed , t o p rac t i ce medicine in any s t a t e . " And 
506(a)(3) defines "mental health the rap i s t " as "a person who i s or 
i s reasonably believed by the pa t ien t to be l icensed or c e r t i f i e d 
4
 In the t r i a l cour t , Goates a t times argued tha t the question of the 
doc to r -pa t i en t p r iv i l ege was governed by Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8 (e .g . R. 
111). The Advisory committee Note to Rule 506 indica tes t ha t the ru le " i s 
intended to supersede Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8(4)". See also Utah Code Ann. 
§58-60-113 ("Evidentiary p r iv i l ege for mental heal th t h e r a p i s t s regarding 
admiss ib i l i ty of any confident ial communication in adminis t ra t ive , c i v i l , or 
cr iminal proceedings i s in accordance with Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence.") . 
in any state as a physician, psychologist, clinical or certified 
social worker, marriage and family therapist, advanced practice 
registered nurse designated as a registered person is engaged in 
the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, 
including alcohol or drug addiction." Similarly, Utah Code Ann. 
§58-60-102 (l)and (5) define a patient or client as "an individual 
who consults or is examined or interviewed by a mental health 
therapist acting in his professional capacity[,]" and include 
within the definition of mental health therapist physicians 
"engaged in the practice of mental health therapy." 
While there is a dearth of Utah case law on this particular 
point, decisions from other courts demonstrate that the existence 
of a doctor-patient relationship turns on a number of factors, 
including whether the doctor has performed tests, prescribed 
medications, and undertaken medical responsibility for the 
patient. See e^ _g. Middleton v. Beckett, 960 P.2d 1213, 1216-17 
(Colo.App. 1998)(no doctor-patient relationship existed between 
psychiatrist and motorist he examined, where psychiatrist 
performed no tests, prescribed no medication, and had undertaken 
no responsibility for motorist's medical care, and where motorist 
placed his condition in issue in medical malpractice action). 
The patient's will or opinion certainly does not control the 
existence of a doctor-patient relationship, for such a 
relationship may exist without the patient's consciousness or 
consent and even over her objection, where a physician attends the 
patient for the purposes of providing professional aid. See e.g. 
State v. Pitchford, 697 P.2d 896, 900 (Kan. App. 1985). In 
Pitchford, the court rejected the government's argument that the 
defendant had no doctor-patient relationship because he did not 
consult with or voluntarily submit to the doctor for medical 
treatment but was combative and resisted medical treatment when 
the police brought him to the hospital. 697 P.2d at 900. The 
court explained persuasively why the patient's attitude toward 
medical treatment does not controlf statingf 
The State's literal reading [of the statute governing 
privilege], however, would render the physician-patient 
privilege inapplicable to many persons needing medical 
treatment the most. Persons brought to a hospital 
unconscious, in severe shock, or otherwise unable to 
consult or submit to a doctor would not be "patients" under 
the State's interpretation. Neither would persons 
involuntarily committed to various mental health 
institutions where the sole object is involuntary 
treatment. Such an interpretation is unreasonable and is 
not mandated by the statute. "The rule of privilege may 
apply where a physician attends a person for the purpose of 
giving professional aid even though the person attended is 
unconscious or unaware of his presence, does not consent, 
or actually objects to being treated." 97 C.J.S., 
Witnesses §294(e)[.] 
Pitchford at 900 (citations omitted). 
In ruling that there was no doctor-patient relationship in 
the instant matter, Judge Wilkinson was likely relying on the 
deposition of Ms. Debry.5 
5
 Out of an abundance of caut ion, Ms. Debry marshals the evidence in 
support of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ru l ing , and demonstrates herein tha t the t r i a l 
court was incorrect as a matter of law. 
Ms. Debry testified that she was taking Synthroid, Paxil, 
Klonopin, and Trazodone at the time of her deposition, and that 
this medication might cloud her memory, that it would not 
influence her judgment, and that she did not know if it impaired 
her ability to answer questions (R. 170, p. 5, R. 171 p.6, R. 178 
pp. 34-35). 
In her deposition, Ms. Debry testified that Goates was 
appointed during her first divorce to assess the proper custodial 
placement of her children (R. 179 pp. 38-39). She indicated that 
she and Mr. Debry went to Goates to insure that Ms. Debry would 
get custody of her children from the former marriage, and she 
maintained that she did not like Goates and never saw Goates for 
her own personal needs (R. 179, pp. 40-41, R. 180 pp. 42-43). She 
testified that he never discussed his diagnosis of her supposedly 
narcissistic personality disorder with her, and she indicated that 
she was never his patient and that he did not diagnose her (R. 192 
pp. 52-53). She testified that she never went to see him alone, 
without her children (R. 190 p. 82). She maintained that he was 
never her doctor, but was the doctor for her children, who 
recommended that she be awarded custody (R. 190 p. 83). She 
testified that she was never his client and he was never her 
counselor (R. 192 page 90). She maintained that she did not see 
him as a patient regarding her mental state, but did acknowledge 
that he did perform psychological testing of her and her first 
husband in assessing the custody issue in their divorce (R. 2 01, 
page 129). She testified that he did not give her any other 
tests, did not counsel her about a mental disorder, and that she 
did not seek this type of advice (R. 202, p. 131). 
In contrast, Debry conceded that he prescribed medication for 
her (R. 177, pp. 31-32, R. 179, p. 40), and a notarized 
pharmacist's list indicated that Goates had prescribed Desyrel, 
Prozac, Valium, and Lopressor to Ms. Debry (R. 294-95). 
Under the rationale explained in Pitchford, Judge Wilkinson 
should not have rested the summary judgment order on Ms. Debry's 
subjective opinion about whether or not there was a doctor-patient 
relationship. This is particularly so, given the evidence 
establishing the existence of a doctor-patient relationship. 
Goates' affidavit, which is the basis for the suit, 
essentially represents that Goates was Debry's doctor and that she 
was his patient, indicating that she had consulted with him 
numerous times, and including his diagnoses (R. 284-286). 
During the discovery process, Goates conceded that he was 
Debry's doctor. In response to Ms. Debry's request for 
admissions, he admitted that he had a doctor-patient relationship 
with Ms. Debry, that he counseled Ms. Debry, and that he had 
written prescriptions for Ms. Debry (R. 287-288). 
Goates told Dr. Jack Jenson that he had a doctor-patient 
relationship with Debry (R. 297). 
The panel opinion from the pre-litigation hearing recognized 
that Goates had a doctor-patient relationship with Debry and 
violated her privilege when he issued the affidavit (R. 291-93). 
i n 
In sum, there was ample evidence of a doctor-patient 
relationship. See Utah Rule of Evidence 506; Utah Code Ann. §58-
60-102; Middleton and Pitchford, supra. 
In ruling that there was no doctor-patient privilege, the 
trial court failed to observe the foregoing legal standards 
defining the doctor-patient relationship. 
Judge Wilkinson also failed to recognize that while questions 
of privilege are normally questions of law for Courts to 
determine, when the facts underlying the privilege are in dispute, 
those facts are to be submitted to the jury. See Berry v. Moench, 
331 P.2d 814, 818 (Utah 1958)(in discussing the common interest 
privilege in a case wherein a physician wrote a letter discussing 
his patient's psychiatric history, the court indicatedf "If the 
facts upon which the privilege would rest are not in dispute, 
whether the privilege exists is a question for the court to 
determine. If they are in dispute the jury must determine the 
facts and upon them the court determines the question of 
privilege.")(footnote citing to the Restatement of Torts omitted). 
Finally, the trial court overlooked the cardinal rules 
governing the adjudication of summary judgment motions — that 
summary judgment is to be granted only when there are no material 
factual disputes, and that all facts and inferences are to be 
drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment — Ms. Debry 
in this case. See e.g. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 
(Utah 1982)(in summary judgment, all facts and inferences are to 
be drawn in favor of party opposing summary judgment). 
At a minimum, the t r i a l court erred in resolving the facts in 
favor of Goates and in g ran t ing summary judgment where the 
ma te r i a l f ac t s underlying the ex is tence of the d o c t o r - p a t i e n t 
r e l a t ionsh ip were in d ispute . See Berry and Bowen, supra. 
This Court should the re fo re reverse the por t ion of Judge 
Wilkinson's ru l ing grant ing summary judgment on the bas i s t h a t 
there was no doctor-pat ient r e la t ionsh ip . 
II. MS. DEBRY DID NOT WAIVE THE DOCTOR-PATIENT PRIVILEGE. 
As noted above, in the minute entry granting summary 
judgment, Judge Wilkinson stated, "The court finds the privilege 
belongs to the plaintiff. The court finds there was not a doctor-
patient relationship. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is 
granted." (R. 544). The order prepared by counsel for Goates and 
signed by Judge Wilkinson states, "Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted and plaintiff's Complaint and each and every 
cause of action thereof shall be and is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits on the basis that plaintiff has not 
established that a physician/patient relationship existed between 
her and Dr. Goates, and that even if a physician/patient 
relationship did exist, that relationship was waived at the time 
Dr. Goates submitted his affidavit in the divorce case." (R. 545-
546). 
The divorce case records in Janice L. Debry v. Robert J. 
Debrv, district court case number 944901038, have been 
supplemented to the record for this appeal.6 These records 
6
 The divorce case is also being appealed, in case number 960571-CA. 
demonstrate that Ms. Debry had not waived the privilege at the 
time that the Goates affidavit was filed. 
Ms. Debry's original divorce complaint did not raise her 
mental health as a claim or defense (R. 248-253; R. 1-6 in the 
divorce case). 
Mr. Debry's counterclaim did attack Ms. Debry's mental 
health, indicating, 
13. Plaintiff suffers from a severe personality 
disorder, which is a mental illness, which mental illness 
predates the marriage between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. The mental illness remains intractable and 
persistent, despite extensive therapy. The mental illness 
has rendered the plaintiff incapable of handling funds and 
monies. Therefore, a conservator should be appointed for 
and on behalf of the plaintiff to manage her financial 
affairs and to ensure that any sums of money that are paid 
by defendant are properly accounted for. 
(R. 15 in divorce case). This counterclaim was filed on March 29, 
1994 (R. 11 in divorce case). 
Ms. Debry denied paragraph 13 of the counterclaim in her 
reply filed on April 7, 1994 (R. 18-19 in divorce case). 
Mr. Debry then filed the Goates affidavit on May 26, 1994 (R. 
24-26 in the divorce case), in conjunction with his motion for a 
mental examination under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35, which 
was filed on May 27, 1994 (R. 48-55 in the divorce case). 
Under any conceivable Utah statute or rule, there was no 
waiver of privilege by Ms. Debry at the time that the Goates 
affidavit was filed, because at the time of the filing of the 
affidavit, Ms. Debry had not raised her mental health as an 
element or factor in any claim or defense. See Utah Rule of 
Evidence 506(d),7 Utah Code Ann. §58-60-114(1) and (2)(b)f8 
Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8(4)/ Rule of Civil Procedure 35.10 
Reference to case law confirms that there was no waiver on 
the facts of this case. Compare Styers v. Superior Court In and 
That rule provides, in relevant part, 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication 
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of 
the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of 
any claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings 
in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of the claim 
or defense[.] 
8
 That statute provides, in relevant part, 
(1) A mental health therapist under this chapter may not disclose any 
confidential communication with a client or patient without the express consent 
of: 
(a) the client or patient; 
(b) the parent or legal guardian of a minor client or patient; or 
(c) the authorized agent of a client or patient. 
(2) A mental health therapist under this chapter is not subject to 
Subsection (1) if: 
(b) the disclosure is part of an administrative, civil, or criminal 
proceeding and is made under an exemption from evidentiary privilege under Rule 
506, Utah Rules of Evidence[. ] 
9
 That statute provides, in relevant part, 
(4) A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, 
be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending the 
patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient. 
However, this privilege shall be deemed to be waived by the patient in an 
action in which the patient places his medical condition at issue as an element 
or factor of his claim or defense. Under those circumstances, a physician or 
surgeon who has prescribed for or treated that patient for the medical 
condition at issue may provide information, interviews, reports, records, 
statements, memoranda, or other data relating to the patient's medical 
condition and treatment which are placed at issue. 
10
 This rule governed Mr. Debry's original motion for a mental evaluation 
of Ms. Debry, and states in relevant part, 
(2) By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered or 
by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any 
privilege the party may have in that action or any other involving the same 
controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or 
may thereafter examine the party in respect of the same mental or physical 
condition. 
0*5 
For County of Mohave, 779 P.2d 352 (Ariz.App. 1989)(in divorce 
proceedings wherein husband sought distribution of debt for his 
psychiatric counseling during the marriage, there was no waiver of 
privilege concerning premarital psychiatric treatment); with 
Clawson v. Walgreen Drug, 162 P.2d 759, 764 (Utah 1945)("a patient 
cannot testify concerning what was said and done by his physician 
in the treatment of the injuries which are the subject of the 
litigation and then close the physician's mouth by claiming 
privilege.").n 
The trial court's ruling that Ms. Debry waived the doctor-
patient privilege was likely based on Ms. Debry's deposition 
testimony.12 
She testified during the deposition that it was in response 
to her effort to get $4,500 a month for medical, dental and 
counseling that Mr. Debry filed the Goates' affidavit (R. 181, pp. 
48-49). Counsel for Ms. Debry clarified that the Goates' 
affidavit was filed four days prior to any request by Ms. Debry 
for support (R. 192 p. 50). Ms. Debry again testified that it was 
in response to her request for support that Mr. Debry moved to 
have her examined (R. 182, p. 50).13 
11
 There is not a great deal of Utah case law on the question of waiver of 
the privilege. However, the plain language of the statutes and rules is 
dispositive. 
u
 Out of an abundance of caution, Ms. Debry marshals the evidence in 
support of the trial court's ruling, and demonstrates herein that the trial 
court was incorrect as a matter of law. 
13
 Ms. Debry testified that she was taking Synthroid, Paxil, Klonopin, and 
Trazodone at the time of her deposition, and that this medication might cloud 
her memory, that it would not influence her judgment, and that she did not 
know if it impaired her ability to answer questions (R. 170, p. 5, R. 171 p.6, 
R. 178 pp. 34-35). 
Assuming arguendo that Ms. Debry had been correct in her testimony that 
the Goates affidavit was filed by Mr. Debry in response to her request for 
In contrast, Ms. Debry testified that her mental state became 
an issue in the divorce after the Goates affidavit was filed (R. 
182, p. 53). 
Once again the trial court erred in relying on the Ms. 
Debry's opinion on the issue concerning waiver of privilege, 
because that issue is governed by the statutes, rules and case law 
quoted above, which demonstrate that there was no waiver on the 
facts of this case. See e.g. Utah Rule of Evidence 506(d); 
Styers, supra. 
Judge Wilkinson also failed to recognize that while questions 
of privilege are normally questions of law for Courts to 
determine, when the facts underlying the privilege are in dispute, 
those facts are to be submitted to the jury. See Berry v. Moenchf 
331 P.2d 814, 818 (Utah 1958)(in discussing the common interest 
privilege in a case wherein a physician wrote a letter discussing 
his patient's psychiatric history, the court indicated, "If the 
facts upon which the privilege would rest are not in dispute, 
whether the privilege exists is a question for the court to 
determine. If they are in dispute the jury must determine the 
facts and upon them the court determines the question of 
privilege.")(footnote citing to the Restatement of Torts omitted). 
Finally, the trial court overlooked the cardinal rules 
governing the adjudication of summary judgment motions — that 
summary judgment is to be granted only when there are no material 
factual disputes, and that all facts and inferences are to be 
alimony to pay for therapy, such a request would not have constituted a claim 
or defense, and thus would not have constituted a waiver of the privilege. 
See e.g. Utah Rule of Evidence 506(d); Styers, supra. 
drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment — Ms. Debry 
in this case. See e.g. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 
(Utah 1982)(in summary judgment, all facts and inferences are to 
be drawn in favor of party opposing summary judgment). 
At a minimum, the trial court erred in resolving the facts in 
favor of Goates and in granting summary judgment where the 
material facts underlying the waiver of the doctor-patient 
relationship were in dispute. See Berry and Bowen, supra. 
This Court should therefore reverse the portion of Judge 
Wilkinson's ruling granting summary judgment on the basis that Ms. 
Debry waived her doctor-patient relationship prior to the issuance 
of the Goates affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order granting 
summary judgment, and remand this matter to the trial court for 
trial. 
Dated this 5th day of May, 1999. 
lapl^ Ami de Montreux ^ 
Counsel for Ms. Debry 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, Bel-Ami de Montreux, hereby certify that I have caused to 
be hand-delivered/mailed, first-class postage prepaid, eight 
copies of the brief, including the original signature copy, to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, and two copies of the brief to P. Keith 
Nelson and Mark L. McCarty at Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, 
Key Bank Tower, 7th floor, 50 South Main Street, P.O. Box 2465, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 this 5th day of May, 1999. 
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\ AFFIDAVIT OF DELBERT T. GOATES 
I Case No. 944901038DA 
1 Judge John A. Rolrich 
My name is Delbert T. Goates. I give the following testimony under oath: 
1. I am an adult and child psychiatrist 
2. I have had approximately twenty consultations with Jan DeBry from June 
17f 1990 to the present 
3« In addition, I have had consultations with her current husband, her first 
husband and all of her children. 
4. In my opinion, Mrs. DeBry experiences the traits of a narcissistic 
personality disorder (as more fiilly defined in DSM-HIR). Features of this condition include 
pathological exaggeration, interpersonal exploitation, and feelings or fantasies of grandiosity. 
However, persons with this disorder also demonstrate a charming and even charismatic exterior. 
5. In my opinion, this has been a lifelong condition which was acquired prior 
to her late adolescence. 
6. I am aware that Mrs. DeBry has been in intensive psychotherapy regarding 
her depression (commonly occurring with narcissism) for several years with several therapists. 
Further evaluation addressing her personality traits is certainly warranted as an impediment to 
her optimal function and the treatment of her depression. 
7. If the Court requires an additional independent evaluation, I would suggest 
a conjoint evaluation of the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas. Menninger is probably the 
foremost clinic in the United States for persons with this type of problem. The evaluation would 
give guidance as to diagnosis, prognosis, and recommended therapy. 
8. Reasonable alimony will sustain Mrs. DeBry's needs. There can be a 
psychological or therapeutic component to alimony. Excessive alimony might feed Mrs. 
DeBry's grandiose fantasies and exploitive tendencies for enhanced self-worth and delusions of 
grandeur. 
9. Mrs. DeBryfs current therapists might be able to use these Court 
proceedings for therapeutic purposes. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court work with 
Mrs. DeBry's current therapists on the issue of whether, and when, and how Mrs. DeBry should 
be confronted with my affidavit, herein. 
2 
DATED this 2>S day of March, 1994. 
DELBERT T. GOATES, M.D. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 






My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY Ptmuqj ^ 
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DEFENDANT ARGUES IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
COUNT: 8.06 
PLAINTIFF RESPONDS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
COUNT: 8.17 
DEFENDANT REPLIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND THE SAME IS SUBMITTED. 
COUNT: 8.21 
AS READ INTO THE RECORD, THE COURT NOW BEING FULLY BRIEFED AND 
ADVISED IN THE PREMISES FINEDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT / DEPOSITION OF THE 
PLAINTIFF IS DENIED. 
THE COURT FINDS THE PRIVILEGE BELONGS TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
THE COURT FINDS THERE WAS NOT A DOCTOR / PATIENT RELATIONSHIP. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. 
DEFENDANT IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER. THE TRIAL DATE IS STRICKEN. 
Addendum III 
P. KEITH NELSON [A2391] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant, Delbert T. Goates, M.D 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANICE L.DEBRY, 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiff, WITH PREJUDICE 
vs. 
DELBERT T. GOATES, M.D., Civil No. 960906212 
Defendant. Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant Delbert T. Goates, M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion 
to Strike Plaintiffs Deposition came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson pursuant to notice on June 10, 1998. Both parties appeared through counsel and 
presented oral argument. The Court having heard oral argument, having reviewed the memoranda 
filed by both parties, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, and it appearing just and 
proper, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is denied; 
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiffs 
Complaint and each and every cause of action thereof shall be and is hereby dismissed with 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 2 1998 
prejudice and on the merits on the basis that plaintiff has not established that a physician/patient 
relationship existed between her and Dr. Goates, and that even if a physician/patient relationship 
did exist, that relationship was waived at the time Dr. Goates submitted his affidavit in the divorce 
case. Both parties are to bear their own respective costs and attorneys' fees. 
DATED this day of June, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
2 
